Interview with Lindsey Grant

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

LINDSEY GRANT

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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[Note: it was necessary to retape a portion of this interview due to tape recorder problems. This led to some unintended duplications. Note particularly the repetitive treatment of the Sino-Soviet schism.]

Q: Lindsey, I wonder if you could give us a little about your background. Where did you come from?

GRANT: Oh, I hadn't thought we were going to talk about me. Let's see. I was born in the South, brought up in Westchester County, New York, and went to college in several different places. I was in the Navy briefly at the end of World War II, and joined the Foreign Service, took the exams in '48. I came in—you had to wait those days—in 1949. I had been at Cornell for my undergraduate degree, specializing in history, specifically Chinese history.

Q: What had attracted you towards a career in foreign affairs?

GRANT: I was particularly interested in China, and this seemed a good way of working on China.

Q: Had you had any China experience in the Navy at all?

GRANT: No, my experience was in destroyer gunfire control in the Navy.

Q: You didn't shoot at anything around China?

GRANT: No. And there's very little application for that specialty in peacetime. [Laughter]

Q: You entered the Foreign Service in 1949. What was the situation at that point, as far as training to be a Foreign Service officer?

GRANT: I guess the best comment on that is that I had already picked up some Chinese before I joined, while I was at Cornell. I had to come in as a staff officer because of the wait to be an FSO, and I served in Washington on the Board of Examiners, as a matter of fact. Then when I went to Hong Kong, I had to pay for my own lessons, because they didn't have any money to pay for Chinese lessons, even as desperately as they needed Chinese speakers.

Q: You went to Hong Kong in 1950.

GRANT: March of 1950.

Q: You were there until 1952.

GRANT: I was there until 1952, went to Singapore, came back, and was there from 1955 to 1958, and in Taipei from 1958 to '61. All that period I was working on China.

Q: What were you doing in Hong Kong?

GRANT: I started out, actually, as a consular, as a staff officer, then got into political. I did economic reporting the second tour.

Q: How did you view China? If you were looking at the situation in China in 1950, this was the time of great turmoil and all. From the Hong Kong vantage point, how did we see the situation?

GRANT: Do you want me to talk about how we felt then, or how I see that period now?

Q: The main thing is I want to know how you felt at the time. Not what happened, but how you felt at the time.

GRANT: How I felt probably is somewhat irrelevant. I was very junior, just came out.

Q: What were you picking up?

GRANT: I came out, remember, of the environment of American universities in the 1940s. So I assumed that the communists—I don't think I was under any misapprehension as to whether they were communists or not—but I assumed that they were the wave of the future, and that's what most people did. I didn't have much respect for the Kuomintang when I got to Hong Kong. I slowly educated myself about both.

Q: How did this education take place? What were you absorbing and where were you absorbing this information?

GRANT: I was dealing with the Americans coming out mostly during that first tour, after I got into political, doing reporting on what they knew about the situation on the mainland. Also, incidentally, trying to figure out on behalf of the consular people who was still left up there. So my primary source of information was the departing Americans in that first tour, plus other nationalities that wanted to talk, and some Chinese who were knowledgeable and willing to talk to Americans. That was basically our source of information.

Q: What was the picture that was emerging for you there? We're talking about the education of a young officer seeing the situation, looking at the communist side and how you felt about them and how this perception changed.

GRANT: The situation we were in, in Hong Kong, was pretty dicey from a number of standpoints. One, you had this great unknown beast on the mainland that might or might not want to do what it talked about. That is, forcibly communize the world as fast as it could. You had, in the United States back in 1950, the beginnings of the 1952 election, in which the Republicans were running in part on the charge that the Democrats were soft on communism, had lost China to the communists. This assumes, of course, we ever had it. You had [Joseph] McCarthy, Senator McCarthy, the first McCarthy, accusing the State Department of being full of communists. I discovered recently that a lot of young folks don't know that there was one before Eugene.

Q: You think of Eugene, who was completely the other side of the spectrum.

GRANT: Yes. We were listening to missionaries and other Americans, White Russians, foreigners, generally, who were coming out of the mainland, leaking out. We had tried to get the Americans to depart long before the communists took over, but a number of them insisted on staying there. Our information was coming largely from these people, who were now being chased out of China by these so-called work teams, teams of young fanatics that the communists were sending in to consolidate their control of the countryside. China, remember, is 80% rural. They were getting rid of everybody that represented an alternative source of authority, including the old landlords, any natural alternative leadership. The technique was to mobilize the most radical poor peasants, to radicalize them, and to get them to accuse these people at huge accusation meetings.

One of the sources of authority, obviously, in a rural Chinese scene might very well be the missionaries. So they were setting them up, charging them with all manner of things, organizing the peasants to go by, and show themselves sufficiently pro-communist by

spitting on the poor missionaries and so on. It was a rough experience, and they were coming out very shaken. But we were beginning to learn both of the roughness of the regime and also to recognize how totally they were extirpating any source of challenge.

The result was that those of us reporting—I can remember feeling this very acutely—figured it was our obligation to tell Washington that what we were seeing was a regime that was establishing itself very effectively in power, even though it was not a very attractive one in many ways. At the same time, you wondered whether your dispatch might suddenly turn up on the Senate floor being quoted or misquoted, quoted out of context by Senator [Joseph] McCarthy. Although I don't think any of us trimmed—I certainly don't remember any trimming—we wrote our dispatches with great care, and what we were saying was: “We feel this crowd is very rough—I think I overestimated the degree to which they were communist, and underestimated that they were also Chinese—but they are going to stay there.”

Q: This is something that I think one should understand. I don't want to put words in your mouth, but our general thinking at the time was that there was such a thing as “a communist,” almost all communists were alike and they were a menace, rather than thinking in terms of nationalities and then communism.

GRANT: This was certainly true, and this was, in a sense, the thing that legitimized the extreme anti-communist positions in the United States. They really did talk as though they wanted to take over the world. They had all that rhetoric—I could quote it chapter and verse—saying that they were going to get rid of us. This does encourage an adversarial relationship. Even after I should have recognized it—it was much later—it must have been about 1959 or '60 that I finally said to myself, “These guys, the Russians and the Chinese, really hate each other.” And yet the schism really came when Mao went to Moscow—it must have been 1956—'55, even—and said to Khrushchev, “We can't afford your liberalization. We've got to keep the whip, got to keep discipline.” And Khrushchev went ahead and did it his way.

I think that this triggered the schism, but in a sense, aside from a deep sense of cultural antipathy, the Chinese looked down on the Russians, as they looked down on other people, and felt themselves the civilized people on earth. At the same time, the Russians had the techniques and the Chinese had to use them. Even their economic organizational techniques were very much in the Russian mode.

It was only when that schism became evident, even to the slowest reader, that there was any real chance of American policy moving. This was long before that.

Q: You were mentioning that you were getting some glimmers of statistics and all coming out of Hong Kong. Could you talk a little about how you saw the reporting? Before the tape recorder was turned off, you mentioned cotton production.

GRANT: That was, actually, in the mid-1950s when I went back to Hong Kong from Singapore, 1955 to '58.

Q: As an economic officer.

GRANT: That's right. The first tour, there were really no data on China. The Chinese communists themselves had, I think, only the crudest of data. Later on, we learned that in spades. We didn't know how little they knew at the time. When I went back and was doing economic reporting, I guess the two things that one quickly learned is that the Chinese use statistics for political purposes. They admit it. They say, “Statistics must serve politics.” They have a propaganda output that says, “We're doing this, this, and this,” which you do well to take very much askance.

Things were, however, beginning to change by the mid-1950s, the Chinese—I think it was December of 1955—put out the first tiny, slim volume of economic statistics. I remember it. It was like stout Cortez espying the Pacific, when all of a sudden this little book came into the office, right after Christmas, in Chinese.

I put all hands to work translating it and getting it to Washington. We began to get some data. We were also getting enough Chinese materials, like provincial newspapers for domestic consumption, not the propaganda stuff, which would give you an idea as to what the rations were in the market towns for pork, cotton, things like that. From this we began to construct some idea as to how the Chinese were doing. They were doing better than our official estimates admitted.

We had, I think, been too much misled by hope and by some old anti-communist reporting people, including our Chinese locals, who hated the communists, into thinking that the Chinese were doing much worse than we finally concluded. I remember this cotton report to which you refer, in which I finally put a covering memorandum on his long annual cotton report, and said, “Feng, the employee, is a loyal and capable fellow. I don't take him on lightly, but I really believe that the Chinese are producing a lot more cotton than his estimates show—out of which you get the point that they may not be quite as cold and bare as his data would suggest.” That was about 1956.

But the other thing we were also beginning to learn was that the official data did not necessarily mean what they claimed. Just after I left in 1958, the great leap forward started. I got back to Washington and found a lot of people believing their claims. I remember saying at the time—I was horrified—”They can't do it that way—that simplistic effort to mobilize labor—these people are putting out these data because they're trying to create a bandwagon.” They claimed that they doubled wheat production in a year and things like that. I think we understood this in Hong Kong earlier than a lot of people in Washington did.

Q: You went to Taipei and you were there from 1958 to 1961. Our ambassador was Everett Drumright. Would you explain how he operated and looked at the situation?

GRANT: Everett Drumright was the most conservative of the pre-war crop of China specialists. As a result, [he was] about the only one who did not get rusticated in the

McCarthyite movement. All of our bright shining young lights were forced out of the Service or forced like John Patton Davies off to irrelevant assignments. “Drum” was very much pro-Kuomintang, and I think he really hoped and perhaps believed that the Kuomintang was going to be able to go back.

For myself, I was doing economic reporting then and I was tremendously impressed, as I think anybody should be who looks at the performance, as to what they (the Chinese Nationalists) were doing even then.

You asked the question before as to how Chiang Kai-shek, with his dismal record on the mainland, did so well in Taiwan. I think the fact is that Chiang Kai-shek was a lot more astute than people thought. He was inarticulate in any language, including Chinese, but he did know that he had to make Taiwan work.

The Chinese Government had basically been frozen into immobilism during the anti-Japanese war, while they were up in Chungking. They couldn't move because powerful interests, including his in-laws, H.H. Kung, T.V. Soong, were skimming the economy of Free China and were not about ready to be interested in revolutionary movements to motivate people. They didn't come to Taiwan. He came on his own, by the way. We had really basically pretty clearly written him off in early 1950, and it was only the Korean War that turned that around. He arrived from the mainland on Taiwan. He had a free hand, and he knew it had to work, and he appointed some brilliant guys. Chiang Monlin, the head of the JCRR, (the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction), was really one of the great men I've ever dealt with, and Chiang Monlin earned the faith of the Taiwan peasant. They carried out a land reform, a very effective one. They did all the things that are needed to make land reform work, setting up marketing cooperatives, credit cooperatives, seed purchasing organizations. In other words, really mobilizing the farm sector. That was a tremendous advantage for Chiang Kai-shek. The Taiwanese anti-Kuomintang movement, the people who were trying to get the Kuomintang out of Taiwan, had very little support in the countryside because of Chiang Monlin.

They had a brilliant financial man, and I was trying to think of his name. Lord, I've forgotten it.

Q: You can fill that in.

GRANT: Yes. K.Y. Yin. He was the one who forced an honest system of foreign exchange control on Taiwan. He dismantled the preferential rates that encouraged those who could get their hands on money to get it out. He made it very difficult to move money out of Taiwan. He managed to force Taiwan's capital to stay right where it was, and he priced the Taiwan NTU (new Taiwan dollar) at a level that made Taiwan competitive economically. That's when their export drive began, based at first on processed agricultural goods.

I remember they learned about mushrooms, and their exports of mushrooms to the United States went from something like a couple of hundred thousand in one year, let's say 1957. They saw what they could do. They went up to about $6 million the next year. The next year it was heading for glory. Kennett Square—the mushroom town in Pennsylvania—was beginning to scream to their congressmen. I remember going to the Chinese and saying, “Listen, cool it. Move out. Diversify so you won't generate these resistances.” But those two things, I think, the agricultural policy and the financial policy coupled together, and Chiang Kai-shek made sure—he had some Neanderthal generals who would like to skim the system, a very popular custom among Chinese generals—and he kept them in check. I think that that combination, along with a very educable and hard-working people, is what started what we see now. Now I believe Taiwan has the third largest gold holdings in the world.

Q: How did you see the American policy towards the problem of the two Chinas during the time you were there?

GRANT: I was in economic section and a bystander, but I think that the really critical turn was 1958, the straits crisis, created Chinese communists initiation of heavy bombardment

of the offshore island by Quemoy, which, as you remember, is within short artillery range of Amoy Harbor. The Chinese communists, I think, saw this as a technique. If they could humiliate the Nationalists, they might begin to create enough political instability in Taiwan to get the Kuomintang to fall or at least become more amenable to some role for them in Taiwan.

I think that several things became very clear. I don't know how long it took me to learn them. I think it took me a year or two before I absorbed them. But one of them was rather amusing. The Nationalists had been taking Americans on tours of Quemoy and saying, “This is impregnable. We could last forever.” As soon as the shelling started, they said, “We have just so many weeks left of shells and supplies. If you don't get in there and help us, it will go down. It will be terrible.” This was a lesson, but I don't think that the administration of Eisenhower and Dulles was particularly anxious to lose Taiwan, having said what they had about the Democrats.

Several things happened. First off, we began to put pressure on the Nationalists to force them to do as much of their own supply as they could, but we did start moving to give them enough protection so they could save the island. When the communists saw the US coming into this close proximity, I think memories of Korea were very clear on both their side and ours, and neither one of us wanted it repeated. They lifted the bombardment, without admitting it, away from the beaches so that we could get the supplies in, so that a crisis was not precipitated.

Meanwhile, we had finally to face the anomalies of our own position. By the way, on the politics of this, I would definitely refer you to others who I'm sure you've been interviewing. But the upshot was that Dulles had to say publicly what had always been privately clear, and that was we did not commit ourselves to the Chinese Nationalists retaking the mainland, nor even to them forever. In some very tough arm-twisting, before he left the island, he forced the Generalissimo to sign a joint statement saying that the Kuomintang would rely primarily on political means to recover the mainland. In other words, “Don't rock

the boat." I think this was very important, because then it finally got us off this rollback syndrome. We couldn't talk rollback after that, after that and Eastern Europe in 1956.

Q: You're speaking of the Hungarian revolution.

GRANT: Precisely.

Q: In which we did not intervene, although there had been a lot of rhetoric about rolling back communism.

GRANT: Precisely. So in a way, both we and the Chinese communists had to learn to live publicly with the realities of the situation. That was a lesson that at least I derived from it.

You asked me whether this was generally the "school answer" in the embassy, and I would say no. I don't remember anybody drawing that publicly. Certainly with Everett Drumright, he was not about ready to make that leap, I think, personally.

Q: In your contacts with Chinese economic people, did you sense any feeling of, you might almost say, relief, now that they could get on with going about business and not take the great leap into the unknown?

GRANT: There were a lot of people in Taiwan who were delighted with that communique. One thing happened within weeks. We began to notice people started fixing up their residences. They obviously had read it and they said, "Uncle Sam ain't gonna put us back there. We are not going to be able to get back on our own. We're going to be here." I think that movement was just palpable. It went right through the community. Sure, my economics-oriented friends laughed about it. They said, "That takes care of the diversion. Now we can get on with it." I think that even for the hardest bitten return-to-the-mainland types, they learned it and they began to recognize that they'd better make their peace with Taiwan.

Q: What about the effect, as you saw it as an economic officer, both economic and political effect, of this very large-standing military force on Taiwan? Was this tolerated or was this a problem?

GRANT: They were getting so old that they finally had to retire. You'd see old sergeants that looked like they were in their '50s and '60s, and some of them were. Some of them began to melt into the countryside. I remember picking one up—way back in a little village where I'd been out walking—and taking him back to his base. He was a funny little character. He had a wife and a family in that village and was favorably known. I'm sure as soon as he could get out, he just retired to his village. There were a lot of old soldiers. There were hundreds of thousands. The Chinese, again, approached this rather well in some respects, under Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of the Generalissimo and his successor until his recent death. Ching-kuo is a wonderful politician and nobody's fool. He realized that you had to do something with these servicemen as they grew old. They created VACRS, we called it. I forget its title now, but it was an employment system for retired servicemen. They put them to work in the mountains, for instance, building roads, logging. They settled wherever they could find some niche for them, yet kept them in a group context. It was a barracks-type existence, except those like my friend who managed to get out. In this sense, they handled it quite well. They kept the people from becoming totally a drag on the society. They kept them, on the other hand, from competing too directly. So it was an effective operation.

Q: It sounds a little bit like the old Roman system of putting the retired legionnaires out on the borders, but having them cultivate and raise families and create loyal cadres in places where they might be needed.

GRANT: Taiwan isn't Romania. It wasn't 2,000 years ago. There wasn't that much space. There wasn't much to cultivate. But they did, actually, a little bit of special cultivation in the mountains. They created a mushroom farm. I told you about that. They did find ways of keeping them together and they did have that by-product. They had a loyal cadre that they

could still turn back to if they needed. It probably minimized the cost. Sure, to carry several hundred thousand soldiers on an island economy of 15 million people was very difficult. I figured it out at one time—I've forgotten the exact conclusion I came to—but certainly the burden of carrying that military in economic terms, was not all that different in size from the amount of aid that we gave them. There would be differences, The aid was in foreign currency—and so on. But it was a burden that they succeeded in handling, I think, very well.

Q: You left Taipei in 1961, the advent of Kennedy. In your reporting prior to that, which was during the Eisenhower Administration, had the concern about the McCarthyites and their later people pretty well died, as far as reporting it as you saw it?

GRANT: Oh, yes. As I say, after Quemoy, the Republicans felt enough tarred so this was no longer an issue. What had been becoming very clear, there were misconceptions on both sides, misconceptions as to what China was, misconceptions about our own policies. As for China, despite the rhetoric, they were pretty cautious. The longer I watched them, the more I was aware of this Chineseness. They feel themselves the center of the earth. “Chung Kuo” means “the central kingdom.” They expect respect from others. They thought they should be playing a big role, even when they had no money to give away. They spent, I think, a billion dollars US equivalent on the Tanzania-Zambia railway, which was strictly a prestige project. In other words, they were pulled by this image. But there were other things that even the slow reader could read. Take the Portuguese colonies of Macau on the China coast and Goa on the Indian coast. The Indians, whom we always think of as being a major democracy and so on, simply walked in and took Goa. The Chinese did not take Macau, and even kept the overzealous local communists from doing so, partly because they didn't want to rock the boat for Hong Kong. And they didn't want to rock the boat for Hong Kong because they were earning money through Hong Kong.

So there was a very strong strain of practicality, which I began to recognize once we saw the schism with the Soviet Union, and realized it was there, and once we recognized—

as a bureaucracy—that the Great Leap Forward had not been a leap at all, it had been a disaster, and that the Chinese had a long way to go.

This was all coming together about the time that the Kennedy Administration came in. This was also the time when I first really became involved in policy. I was simply a junior officer out reporting. I got back in 1961 at the end of the year. We created first the mainland China desk, at the division level. Then within eight months, Joe Yager had come back from Taiwan and was running this area. We carved off the mainland China desk and made it the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, thereby giving it office-level status and beginning to admit that the Chinese communists existed. That created a place for a focus. This was all happening right then under the new Kennedy Administration. There was a feeling in the air that Kennedy would like to do something about China, but they hadn't really focused on it, so it was a wonderful time, in a way, the sense that people wanted something done, but didn't know quite what they wanted.

There were a number of things we began to do then. One of them was to put to rest this McCarthy thing you're talking about, about losing China. There was still a so-called Committee of One Million, which was a non-governmental organization, proclaimed itself a million strong—I thought it probably was lucky if it had a few thousand—which was diehard pro-Kuomintang. You had people like Senator Knowland from California, who was sometimes called “the senator from Taiwan.” There were a lot of redoubtable people who managed to sort of freeze this situation. One of the things that I focused on early on was: how do we break this myth? It seemed to me that if you could challenge the Committee of One Million and the extreme pro-Kuomintang people, directly, and they couldn't mount much of a counterattack, that you'd clear the way towards a more realistic policy towards China. The instrument came along. A fellow named Jim Thomson, who has been up at Harvard for years, was an assistant to the Assistant Secretary for the Far East, we called it then, Roger Hilsman. Jim and I and several others saw it very much in the same light.

Jim saw an opportunity in a speech coming up in San Francisco to make the challenge, to throw down the glove, if you will.

Q: San Francisco is a good place to do it.

GRANT: That's right. This was the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, a good, respectable forum. He told me about it. There had already been a speech prepared, a standard 1950s-type rhetoric speech. We agreed, “Let's deep-six this and see if we can now say something about China.” The Hilsman speech was December 1963, and it sounds real timid now. What that speech did was to say, “We don't love the Chinese communists. We think that they would be happier, and the world would be happier, if they had a more relaxed view of other people's rights to select their own government. But we think these people are going to be around and we're going to be dealing with them.”

Now, there wasn't anything really new. Right from 1954, we'd been having ambassadorial-level talks with China. They started at that meeting in Geneva where Dulles refused to shake hands with Zhou En-lai, which has become a part of history. Sure, that was Dulles all over, this dramatic public position, but allowing the opening of ambassadorial-level talks. So we weren't saying anything very new, but we said it publicly. “These guys are going to be around. We plan to deal with them.” In a sense, we challenged the conservative lobbies to do something about it, and they couldn't raise a whimper.

There was a pretty good press-alerting campaign under way. A fellow named Alan Whiting —who was actually in the Research Bureau and shouldn't have been in press contacts at all, but he was quite a wheeler-dealer—got the press alerted to this, so the press was ready and waiting. We got a tremendous reaction. If you're interested in how decisions are made, by the way, it's rather amusing. We cleared that speech with Governor Harriman, the number three officer in State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, cleared it actually with his special assistant, who didn't spot what was so important in it, and said, “Sure, that looks innocuous enough.” We never cleared it anywhere else.

Q: I think this is very important, because this is just what we're trying to bring out. In other words, this was something that was generated relatively low down within the bureaucracy, but the idea was using almost boilerplate-type language, but changing the emphasis and all, things we had been saying.

GRANT: That's right, to admit that they're going to be around and we're going to deal with them publicly, and just put it out.

Q: But then the idea, I take it, this was not just to say this, but this was also to get the press and say, "Look at it, fellows. Look at this speech closely. It means this."

GRANT: Right. Yes. Actually, one of my current pursuits has been decision-making in government, or foresight. I use this as an example. I speak of a couple of greased pigs with an idea. The government is full of greased pigs. If the listener to this tape thinks that government decisions are made in organized or rational ways, this is a good lesson.

We started it. He immediately, of course, told Hilsman what we were working on.

Q: In other words, he told Hilsman, "Look, this is real policy, although it may not seem like it"?

GRANT: Hilsman understood it. There was no problem there. We told Hilsman, "We're going to do a speech for you that's going to open it up."

Hilsman said, "Fine. Go ahead and work up the draft." He had his special assistant, Joe Neubert, take a look at it, had us keep him informed. But aside from that one clearance, as I say, we didn't go over to the White House and say, "We're about to really unload one on China." If we had, everybody would have probably wanted to get in the act.

What we did do was to create something that flew, and the Committee for One Million was barely heard from. There wasn't a whimper. Nobody complained. Everybody said, “Finally, the United States is getting its act in order.”

It was right in line with what the Kennedy Administration liked, I mean Kennedy and his Irish mafia. This was forward looking, this was new. It was their kind of thing. They were quite happy with it, and we never heard any complaint from the White House of not having checked it out with them.

Anyway, that was the way we were trying to move it. We were trying to bring public policy into line with our recognition of the diplomatic realities.

Q: How did this fly? What reflections were you getting after all this of preparing the American public and all? What response was coming from the other side, from the Chinese?

GRANT: By the way, one of the things I was doing, I was out on the lecture circuit, talking wherever I could to TV, radio programs, to national organizations, meetings, and so on, to try to explain what we're about and getting good vibes from them. So there was quite a little operation going.

What we were also trying to do with the Chinese communists was to adjust the tone of our Warsaw talks a bit. We got very little response, to answer your question directly, but I'll expand on that a bit. I had, as were a lot of us young people at that time, been deeply impressed by [George] Kennan's containment policy for the Soviet Union. That was, I think, 1949. It was a very impressionable time for me. I remember believing, even from day one when I was in Hong Kong, that in a real world, the only way to deal with a threat like the Chinese communists is just that, to make foreign adventure—real foreign adventure against our interests—expensive and dangerous, but to make an evolution towards a less unfriendly condition promising—to offer them that possibility.

We ran the preparation of the Warsaw talks from our office. David Dean, by the way, is back in town and could talk to this, because he was the one who actually did the drafting. It was the devil's own time to keep on finding things to talk about every month or two. I forget how often we met. But what we did was constantly pick up little themes. Like there was an epidemic in China. We had an embargo, of course, on trade with China. We said to them, “We are going to lift the embargo so that drugs can be shipped if you'll need them or are interested in having them.” We had, of course, an embargo on travel with China. We got this lifted so journalists, if they could get in, could go. We were trying to find as many small ways as we could, just suggesting, “Sure, there's room here for dialogue.”

The Chinese communists' standard reply—and it was said in a thousand ways, a thousand times—was, “There can be no progress on secondary issues until the primary issue, your occupation of our Taiwan, is resolved.” But I remember writing to Marshall Green when he came in as Deputy Assistant Secretary—my immediate boss—that, “Unless we do this, we're in the worst of both possible worlds. We're scotching the snake, but not killing it, as Shakespeare said. We're avowedly hostile, but not willing to do anything about Chinese communist control of China. This will simply mean a hostile and not necessarily weak China. So we have got to move towards an explicit containment type of dialogue.”

This was the language we were playing during 1962, '63, '64, until, unfortunately, the Vietnam problem came to intervene and you simply could not move very far on China, with us on opposite sides of the Vietnam issue.

Q: During this time, what was happening in China and how did we see developments within China? We're talking about 1961 to 1964.

GRANT: Basically 1961-1965, something like that. We were very slow to pick up the changes. In 1961, when I first got back, China had just been through the complete collapse of the Great Leap Forward. As we know now, millions of Chinese died. I think the total population even plummeted. The birth rate just slid down to nowhere, and this is all

in more recent data. We didn't appreciate any of that. Again, I think that the field probably had a better sense of China than Washington. I, of course, had been working strictly on Taiwan for three years, but was in regular touch with our Hong Kong people. There was a lot of coming and going. Also with Chinese scholars. I was not nearly on target as to how bad things were, but I discovered that CIA was directing a national intelligence estimate which showed Chinese GNP still rising in 1960. I said, “This is absurd!”

So I think that there was a differential between the field and Washington, at least in my case. There wasn't the beginnings of a real understanding as to what was happening as we now know it from documents that have come out in the turbulence of recent decades. But it was very clear that a counterattack had been launched by the economic rationalists, if you will, and we were beginning by this time to recognize that it was by no means a monolith. There were these divisions. You could see Zhou En-lai coming back into prominence, and some of the other more conservative leaders. They went back and resurrected the vilified birth control efforts. They shifted their focus. I think their first one was on light industry and industry serving agriculture. There were several formally during the period, and I've now forgotten which ones came in what order.

But basically, this was a recognition that massive capital-intensive investment was eating up the resources, and they needed to get less capital-intensive solutions out faster. That was, I think, by everybody's standard, the reason. And it was true that during the early and mid-1960s, there was a quite rational discussion within China, and you could see this in their output, their regular international reports and reports of their meetings and so on, that they were trying in pragmatic terms to deal with their problems—leaving, of course, the ideologues and the old ideologue Mao Zedong more and more frustrated with this descent of the revolution into the practical.

Again, we very seldom predict—I think now or then—what the Chinese are going to do. All the expert can do is get there faster with an explanation as to what just happened. It was

a period of retrenchment and sanity, and we recognized it as such, and we spotted the cultural revolution for the insanity it was, much faster than we had the Great Leap Forward.

Q: Why is it that we have trouble understanding what's happening in China? Were there discrepancies coming, say, from our reporting, from covert sources and the ones we were getting from the Central Intelligence Agency? Did they have a different line than we had? Was this a problem?

GRANT: In that particular instance, that national intelligence estimate, the more optimistic view was coming out of the Langley bureaucracy.

Q: Langley being where CIA has its headquarters.

GRANT: In the field, I'm not so sure that there was that much of a divergence. I think that it would depend on the individual. I think we tended to be in communication and probably think very much the same way.

As to why we don't guess right, it's just an opaque society. I remember going to Cyprus after I had worked on China for years, and just being astonished. Or India. India was much more open. You could tell what was brewing. These people managed to keep it so close that we really didn't know.

Now, I've been annoying my old China-watcher friends since I've been out of the business, by saying, “We never guess right.” This offends them. In fact, we did guess right on their external behavior, which has been much more consistent through all these periods than their internal. We recognized belatedly, as I mentioned—certainly knew it by the early 1960s—that the Chinese were going to be rather cautious in their foreign policy. We did guess right, certainly our office did—Asian Communist Affairs—and I did personally, when the dispute flared up with India in 1963, (I guess that was) the Indians having belatedly discovered that the Chinese were in a part of Ladakh that they thought was theirs.

Q: This is up in the Himalayas.

GRANT: That's right. It's the western tip of Tibet and the eastern edge of Kashmir. The Indians claimed it, but they hadn't been there enough even to realize that the Chinese were there and building a road through it. Then they tried to push the Chinese out. The Chinese were not to be pushed, and retaliated by the attack in NEFA, the northeast frontier territories of India just to the east of Bhutan. I can remember in that instance we said to ourselves, “The way the Chinese have been behaving, they have no advantage in getting too far into NEFA, certainly not in getting onto the Indian plain.”

This was November, as I recall. The winter was coming on. Their supply lines were extremely extended. All they were trying to do was to warn the Indians, “If you won't make a deal that accommodates our interests in the west, we can cause you trouble in the east, where you're very vulnerable.”

I remember saying, “They'll probably pull out. They don't want to spend the winter in that forward position. They don't want to get dug into it.” That was a very wise move on their part. In Quemoy, they had seen the difficulty of how you back off an embarrassing situation if you can't stay there. So they just simply turned around and walked away. In that sense, we did make a prediction.

Also, the fact that they did not move overtly in Vietnam. Over this there was a tremendous debate. I was very much a dove on Vietnam, but not because of China. It was because I didn't think we could win. I had to take the responsibility for North Vietnam when we created the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, and North Vietnam, North Korea, and Outer Mongolia became part of my watching area. I then began to inquire about what we knew about the table of organization, the basic facts of life in Hanoi, and discovered we knew nothing. I thought this was catastrophic, and I was convinced by other friends that, in fact, we were in a very bad situation.

But I did not think that the Chinese were going to come in overtly. As a matter of fact, there was a very good intelligence estimate, or war game. It had a Greek letter—I think it was Omega—run out of the Pentagon, but with State, CIA, a lot of other participation. They played the game through sometime in the mid-1960s, and the way they played it, the Russians and Chinese kept putting in enough to counter our efforts, but just enough, and not moving beyond that, and we kept bogging down. If we had paid attention to that war game, we'd have gotten a very good steer as to how we should have behaved in Vietnam. It would have saved us a lot of heartache later on, because that's exactly what they did. So on external policy, I think we did better.

Q: Just to get an idea on policy. The Chinese were giving the Indians a bloody nose. You in your office were saying, "This looks like that's just what it is. This is not something that's going on." There has been the perception for years in the United States (or was in this period) that we're talking about a force that would go anywhere at any time and take anything. We were talking about communism. Were you having problems selling the idea of a limited punitive engagement in India to others within the State Department or the government?

GRANT: Carol Laise was my counterpart at the time. She was running the Office of Indian Affairs, whatever they called it. As I remember, she bought this as very possible. I don't remember an argument. For another thing, the Chinese did what we said they were going to do within a matter of ten days or so, so the issue was resolved.

Q: That's one nice thing about policy: it takes so long. [Laughter]

GRANT: What we had there was rather interesting. Galbraith, who was ambassador in India at the time, this is about the only time I'm aware of that he actually used his old White House connection effectively at all, but he was just dying to come down on the Indian side of this whole argument. He managed to force through a US Government position endorsing the Indian view of the border, whereas our view—and I think the India desk

rather shared it—was that this was none of our business, that we should have left that whole question of borders for much longer resolution between them. So in that sense, even though Galbraith was associated with Kennedy and with this whole new school, his instinctive view—I guess it was probably “localitis”—he simply wanted to take the Indians' position. He wasn't about ready to give a nickel to the Chinese.

Q: We had a secret agreement with the Indians that we would supply air support if the Chinese came barreling on. This came after the fact. Do you recall that?

GRANT: I don't, and I should have been aware of it. If I've forgotten it, that's rather odd, because that would be very important. See, in 1965 I went to India. I swapped jobs with Jake Jacobson. He came back to my job in Asian Communist Affairs.

Q: The reason I say that, this Monday, just two days ago, I had the first of what will be several interviews with Nick Veliotes, and he mentions this, this secret treaty which nobody seems to know about, when the Indians were saying, “We might want to take you up on this, because the Chinese are making noises.” He referred to it and said we had this.

GRANT: I'll be seeing Nick again shortly. I'll ask about that, because I certainly don't recall there being anything, certainly nothing like a treaty.

Q: Maybe it was an agreement.

GRANT: I'm not even aware of an agreement. There may have been some sort of message at a very high level of classification that I was simply never briefed on when I got there. That is conceivable. The US did some contingency planning, but I'm not aware we ever told the Indians. Maybe Galbraith just took it on himself to tell them. Nick was in Delhi.

Q: You might talk to him, because he brought this up.

GRANT: I am unaware of it. There were a bunch of things going on at that time, in which we had one sort or another of dealing with the Indians, but a lot of that is, I think, still

classified. It's conceivable that this was some sort of exchange in this area. But I was aware of so much of it that I am surprised if there was anything really said.

Q: You might mention it to him. Again, looking at the Chinese external relations, a very important thing was, of course, the relations with the Soviet Union. How were we seeing it at the time?

GRANT: How were we seeing the Chinese relations?

Q: With the Soviet Union.

GRANT: I have never had any reason to question that once we recognized the schism, we read it fairly close to the facts. Generally they behaved toward the Soviets about the way we expected. For instance, in the troublesome Xinjiang problems and little border problems along the Amur River, the Chinese behaved towards the Russians about like we expected, which is to say, quite hostile. They weren't about ready to do anything with the Russians to resolve these little issues. The Russians were actually the ones who were probing periodically to see whether they could soften the confrontation one way or another. The Chinese kept saying, “Get your troops away from our border and maybe we can talk.”

Q: How did this schism manifest itself and first come across your radar, you might say? You were in various jobs, but dealing with China. At one point, we felt that this was an indivisible bond, that communists were communists, and they were both together. Yet you're saying we hadn't realized how Chinese the Chinese Communists were. How did this show itself? When did you first see the reflections of the schism?

GRANT: I forget whether it was in the part of the tape that we lost that we touched on this before.

Q: I don't think we have.

GRANT: Okay. Yes, that's a central issue, because as long as the Chinese and the Soviets seemed to be part of a monolithic communist movement that was out—as it regularly said it was—to replace capitalism and us, anybody arguing policy had a very good reason to say, “You've got to do everything you can to make life more difficult for these people, to weaken them.” The Hilsman speech moved, for instance, the whole slow opening up of US-China policy, became possible only once we had recognized that that was a false view of the world and that this was not a monolith.

The Chinese had very grave differences with the Russians over policy. I think that they really were terribly bitter that they paid the price to save North Korea, and the Russians were the ones who became the tutelary power because of their ability to provide more aid. But it's an ethnic and national sense. The Chinese are very proud and do consider themselves to be the most civilized people on earth, and the Russians not. To have been, during the early 1950s, in this secondary relationship was terribly galling to them.

We can now date the schism pretty much to when Mao went to Moscow in 1955 or '56 (I forget which) and said to Khrushchev, who was embarking on liberalization, “Don't do it. It makes problems for us and we can't afford liberalization now. We've got to keep the screws on to get our problems solved, to get our economy going.” And Khrushchev turned him down. That was undoubtedly the watershed out of which it all came.

We didn't perceive this—at least I didn't—and I don't remember even a serious statement within our government of the idea that there was a schism until—and here I'm fuzzy. I wouldn't have been seeing a lot of this till I got back in 1961, but by the time I got back in '61 from Taiwan, I remember I was already convinced of it. I would say that it was probably in 1958 or '59 that I personally came around and said, “Yes, this is real. I'm pretty sure it's real.” And that probably was on the basis of conversations in Hong Kong or with people from Hong Kong.

Q: Was this slow to dawn on the State Department, do you think?

GRANT: I think that others were probably moving at somewhat the same speed. By the time that the Kennedy Administration came in—I don't recall—the best litmus of this would be whether you had other agencies or other people within the Department of State objecting to what we were doing in 1962 and '63, things like the instructions for the Warsaw talks, or the Hilsman speech itself after it came out, or various other policy moves.

I think that others perceived the split to be as we did: real. Consequently, they were willing to go along with it. When objections were taken to our policy proposals, it was usually for very different reasons. For instance, I was very anxious in the UN Chinese representation issue to see us get out of the way of what I thought was an inevitability. That was that the Chinese, despite their rhetoric, were not doing anything, really, to upset other people. I mean, after all, Burma. We've already spoken of Macau and Hong Kong. They leave them there simply out of self-interest. They learned their lesson very quickly about Taiwan. Burma, they never have given, until the present day, the Burmese Communists the kind of support they easily could have. Northern Thailand offered opportunities and they didn't exploit them. They did not move into Laos against the Vietnamese, although they were obviously looking at it, even building roads.

The fact that they weren't doing anything meant that more and more countries would leave us on the Chinese representation issue. The Third World was growing, more countries coming into existence who remembered colonialism, but didn't have anything against the Chinese, and thought of them as Third World. So I figured that we probably were not going to be able to hold our line for very long in the UN. I thought it was anathema to adopt two Chinas, because neither the Republic of China nor the Communists would accept that; both of them would excoriate us. So I was trying to find a way to get others, in effect, to weld Republic of China into its position as best you could do it, while you let the Communists in. One of the techniques I proposed, one of the slogans, was “two contenders. We're not arguing that there are two Chinas; we're just saying that there are

two people, both of whom say they're China, both of whom control some land; we're willing to let them both in."

I had resistance to that, but not from the whole China, the Far Eastern area. I had some problem with some of the more conservative people on the Republic of China desk, but a lot of people liked that idea. It was the German desk at EUR, European Affairs, that objected because of the parallel for East Germany.

So by that measure, I would say that the world had turned, that the monolith image had gone enough so that except for a few sort of diehard redoubts, there were very few people arguing the unified communist threat by the early 1960s.

Q: Then should we move on to India for a while and then get back?

GRANT: Sure. I don't have much to say about India, but I'd be delighted to discuss it.

Q: Just say what you did there in India, your major concerns, and we'll move on. We'll come back to the rest.

GRANT: I went to India in a swap with Jake Jacobson as the guy in the Embassy who was supposed to be dealing with the Indians about everything in the east: China, Vietnam, and so on. For part of the time, I had the whole communist world. This was sort of a technical assignment. It was not a terribly demanding assignment. It was nothing like the Asian Communist Affairs assignment. (I think Bill Bundy was delighted to see me go, since I'd been sort of a thorn in the flesh. I kept saying, "We're on the wrong course in Vietnam.") I didn't do much and had a thoroughly good time. It was an extraordinary civilization to get three years of exposure to.

Q: How about your Indian counterparts? They had their own rhetoric about Vietnam and opposed to the United States there. Their membership in the International Control Commission was not a very positive one from at least our point of view. But how about

your contacts within the Indian bureaucracy? How did they feel about what we were doing in Vietnam?

GRANT: I went in and spoke my piece, which was the US official position, and they spoke their piece. We didn't bloody our swords too much. I mean, we both just reiterated positions. They obviously didn't convince the United States, nor we them.

Interestingly enough, I had some very close friendships there, some of whom I kept with until very recently, even though we did disagree in many ways. On the perception of China, I think that they recognized in some degree that we had something for them to learn. One of the people, J.P. Narayan, who was later ambassador here, was ambassador in China for a while [became President of India in 1997]. He was the director of that part of the foreign office most of the time I was there. We had really fairly frank and profitable exchanges about China. They would actually call me up and say, “We've got something here that we'd like your reaction on.” For instance, there would be an occasional shooting at the passes and border points. I can recall their actually asking me if I'd come by and discuss it, to get our reading as to whether this presaged anything bigger. They knew that we had some capabilities to tell whether the Chinese had moved up some military capabilities that they should know about.

And on an even more personal basis, I got a call once in some real agitation. They had their equivalent of FBIS, Foreign Broadcasting Service.

Q: This is an outfit that overtly monitors broadcasts, translates it, and distributes it.

GRANT: Right. They had their own version, their own operation of the same sort, and they had a message from Peking that was taking the Pakistan side in spades, wild language, right during a very tense period with Pakistan. I think it was just after the brief war in 1966, I guess that was—'65?

They called me in and said, “What do you make of this? What are the Chinese doing?” I remember looking at it and being totally incredulous, and saying, “I think you've got the wrong dateline on this. Why don't you call your office up in Simla and see if that thing didn't come out of Pakistan, rather than Peking?” And it had. And they were rather appreciative. So there was actually a rather close relationship. But that doesn't mean anything in foreign affairs terms.

Q: How did they see the role of China in Vietnam?

GRANT: They did not consider this to be a Chinese initiative or thing. In this sense, although obviously I didn't say as much, they shared my evaluation of it. The Chinese were doing this with the Vietnamese because they didn't dare not to, did not want the Russians to upstage them—which the Russians did, anyway. There was a lot of tension between Vietnam and China. I knew it, and they did, and I think that they perceived this as being basically an intra-Vietnamese hassle that we shouldn't be in.

Q: It's a doctrine that is now discarded, but every once in a while crops up, and that is the domino theory, which was to the effect that if the North Vietnamese win here, particularly early on, this means that obviously Cambodia and Laos will come under their suzerainty, which it has up to a point, and that means that there will be increased pressure on Thailand and Malaysia and Singapore and all. Was there any feeling of this? And this could be a threat to India itself, because they're a democracy. Did they feel that there was anything to this?

GRANT: If they did, they didn't say it. They didn't admit it. Yes, the domino theory, of course, was perhaps the most important part of the rationale we used, and we'll never know if in Thailand the people had begun to perceive that you couldn't stop this wave, if they would have collapsed. The Thai don't like the Vietnamese and don't particularly want to give up. So I'm not sure they would have caved at all. After all, if this had happened in the 1950s, it might have been even more of a threat, but the lines were fairly well drawn,

and I think the perception of China as not being just part of a monolith that was going to engulf them, and the perception of the North Vietnamese as being Vietnamese was pretty well advanced.

The Indians would simply say they didn't believe it. They didn't worry if the countries wanted to go communist. They didn't worry about it, and they didn't think that this was a threat to them. What they may have felt internally is somewhat different, because, after all, the Chinese example led to the formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist/ Leninist). From the Congress Party's perspective, that had a good result and a bad result. The good result was that it split the Communist Party. The bad result was that it created a much more virulently struggle-prone party in East India, a Communist Party. So they had some evidence that there could be spin-off effects like this, but they never admitted it.

Q: Then back again. You came back to Washington, to the same job, essentially? What were you doing after you left New Delhi?

GRANT: I came back very briefly to INR, to Intelligence and Research. That lasted a couple of months, and then I went over as a staffer in the NSC with the incoming administration, with [Henry] Kissinger.

Q: Could you describe the spirit, the feeling, the atmosphere? It was one of the most important times of power for the National Security Council.

GRANT: It was a heady time, believe me.

Q: What were you doing?

GRANT: Everything! [Laughter] It was wild. There was a tremendous sense of power, and it was not unjustified. Henry was a master politician. It was informal, extremely busy. Henry ran it, I would say, in a pretty effective way. He put his stamp on it, but by no means tried to second-guess everything. He couldn't. We were so busy producing things. For instance,

the regular briefing reports to the President went through and Henry never even reviewed them. They were done by the staff, the daily briefings. You had to delegate a lot.

There was a lot done which I perceived at the time to be wrong. We were instructed we couldn't tell State about this or that, a lot of things. The degree to which the decisions were centralized was extraordinary. We sought—I think I did, and I suspect that the other staffers did—to bring people in informally, so we could get their knowledge, their background information, and so on, but we would prepare the briefing materials by ourselves for Presidential meetings, for the press conferences and so on. We prepared the materials that Henry saw. The briefing books from State would come over and be attached, then pulled off at the last minute, I'm sure.

We were writing for the President, and there was an extraordinary process when he had a press conference. We would all invent questions and then invent answers to them and sort of play them against each other and check them out. Henry would certainly look at it. He was, by the way, called Henry. It was very informal. Everybody was first name, except Al Haig; he always called him Dr. Kissinger. Thereby lies a lesson on being too informal.

We'd go home and turn on our radios or our television, or if we couldn't get home, we'd turn one on in the situation room, and have the President, who had a remarkable memory —still does—answer the questions the way we suggested. If you don't think that's a trip, you don't understand. [Laughter]

I perceived at the time that it was terribly dangerous to be so narrowly focused—tunnel vision—when you had that much to do and were driving projects that you knew Henry and the President wanted, or that you were selling. The vetting to take a look at the lateral implications of what you were doing drops away very fast. As a matter of fact, since I retired, I have been writing about this issue. The word of art is “foresight.”

After I left there, I wrote some memoranda to the Secretary of State about how one might make the NSC connection and the foresight process work better without derogating from

the President's final authority. We needed to organize the process, because it was much too narrow. On the NSC Staff we were not clearing whole concepts with State; just floating them on our own.

One example in my area was the Nixon Doctrine, which we started by calling the Guam Doctrine. This was for the first Far Eastern trip the President took. We were doing briefing papers, and I was the one charged with doing the first run of briefing papers. I thought, “He needs a theme, an overall unifying theme.” And I developed this thing which came partly from having been listening to what the President had been saying and writing before, and partly out of my own head, which he then discussed with the reporters in Guam. And he started calling it the Nixon Doctrine. This later appeared in the President's first annual Foreign Policy Report. That idea, that paper, I put in the briefing book. Kissinger took it out, said, “We don't need this.” The book went up for the President's approval. The next day, Kissinger said, “Where was that general paper?” And I never knew why, but he took it and had it put back in the book. He changed one sentence, as I recall.

Nobody ever checked this with State. Nobody said, “What will happen if we make a major departure, describing our relationships with a lot of other countries in the world?” And it was major. It said, in effect, “We can't protect you from yourselves. If you can't run a good government and you lose the affection of your people, we can't help you. You've got to be able to do it. We'll help protect you from the outside, but it's your initiative first.” As I say, this was enshrined in that first foreign policy paper that he did, the annual report. It got considerable attention when it came out.

Q: One that strikes immediately home is the Philippines, a place you never served. What did this mean there?

GRANT: I don't recall. I just don't recall. We undoubtedly got some reporting about this, but I do not remember it anymore. I'm sure it did lead to questioning. I'm sure there was an exchange on this.

Q: What about your relations with the State Department? Here you were, a Foreign Service officer. You say you were under instructions not to consult?

GRANT: Yes. That was very difficult, very bad.

Q: What did you do?

GRANT: I used to get over—one of us would—to the staff meetings, so we'd keep in touch with what they were talking about, but it was unfair, because we would sometimes know some things that were happening that we simply were under instructions not to talk about. I know that Marshall Green used to get a little bit nettled. I'm very fond of Marshall. He told me one time, “That's all right. You're going to have to come back to State some day. We'll get you then.” [Laughter] But it was not the way to run a railroad, and I thought it then and I think it now.

Incidentally, there were funny things. I can remember Henry would pick up some staffer to go with him to an Under Secretary's meeting, and I can remember he'd get bored or decide he'd like to leave early, just to throw his weight around, and wave whatever flunkey he had brought to his chair. So I found myself sitting for the White House at an Under Secretary's meeting or a JCS meeting. As I say, it was exciting, and there was an enormous amount of responsibility.

I can remember—for instance, talking about the Philippines—a very minor thing, but it's just a little example. The Department—the desk officer—and the Department of Agriculture had a difference of opinion as to how much PL 480—

Q: PL 480 being surplus money generated by agriculture.

GRANT: In this case, it was actually the grain shipments of PL 480. How much we should give the Philippines the next year. So he called up and said, “What should we do?”

I said, “Tell me what your position is, then tell the Agriculture guy to call me and tell me what his position is.” They both did. Then I called them both and said, “Okay, why don't you go with such and such a number.” And they did. All they needed was one of those magic cubes that come out heads or tails. We provided that function. I don't think I even bothered to report that. I don't think I told anybody about that. It was just in the course of the day. So there's a tremendous amount of authority that centers there, and it does need a more systematic vetting process.

Q: How did you feel about Henry Kissinger at the time? Did you feel he was keeping you well informed, or did you feel there was always another agenda? Did you have the feeling he was being almost puckish, playing games, or did you feel there was an agenda?

GRANT: I guess all of the above. I definitely knew there was a lot that he knew that he wasn't telling me about my area. As a matter of fact, it's very interesting. On China, John Holdridge, who I hope you've interviewed or will interview—

Q: Marshall Green has interviewed Holdridge for us.

GRANT: Good. Marshall told me that he and John had been in touch. John was the only NSC staffer, as far as I know, presumably Al Haig, because Al was handling the papers, who actually knew the details of the whole opening towards China. I was the China guy there, among other things. I handled everything in the Far East but Vietnam. But I was not in it. I knew that I was out of something, because there was enough movement. So you knew this. But Henry also gave you—for one thing, he was unquestionably brilliant. His ability to absorb information constantly surprised me. His willingness to use his people, in the good sense, was very gratifying. We were given a lot of room to do what we thought we had to do, without even asking or checking, as long as we thought it was our judgment. So I had very considerable respect.

I always thought, thought it at the time, that Henry was more at home in the Congress of Vienna than he is in this end of this century. He had no sense, as far as I could tell, of tectonic movements, the kind of thing that I was becoming even then worried about, the whole environment, population, resources range of issues. All this kind of thing meant nothing to him. He's a balance-of-power man.

I think, in retrospect—I couldn't judge at the time—Henry really didn't advance Nixon's agenda very much, and I think he'll be seen as a wonderful tactician, but not a strategist, which is sort of an interesting inversion for an academic.

Q: In these interviews, one comes across a lot of places where the best thing they felt Henry Kissinger could do was stay out of it, because he saw everything in Soviet-American terms and balance and power.

GRANT: Yes. Of course, Marshall had lots of problems with Henry. [Laughter]

Q: But you catch this in other places. The people in Africa say, "The best thing he ever did was not to know where it was."

GRANT: Yes, yes. And one of the worst things he did was when I was later in Cyprus and he thought he knew how to handle that Cyprus problem. That's very true. Henry changed. He got a little confident as he stayed on. When I got back to State after a period in the War College, he was no longer Henry; he was Mr. Kissinger. I used to call him Henry, which obviously nettled him. He changed and became over-confident. But the first couple of years there, it was brilliant.

Q: You were there from when to when?

GRANT: Basically it was about a year and a half to two years. I guess it was the end of January, right at the beginning, a week into the new administration, until July a year later, at which time I had been working about 70-hour weeks, then went to the War College.

Q: How did he use Larry Eagleburger, who has always been considered his right-hand man?

GRANT: Larry was going to be his right-hand man and had a heart attack or a stroke and had to be gotten out of there, and left within days. Larry was a good guy. I can just remember his trying to help getting us set up, just the physical process. You walk into the NSC, you walk into that space after a change of administration, and there's nothing. No files, no nothing. Literally, you create things anew. I think it's improved. I'm not sure. Larry was right in there trying to figure out, arguing about space and things like that. But he was gone almost instantly, and that was when Al Haig was pressed into service.

Q: I want to ask you about Haig. You were working with General Haig at the time. He was a colonel then?

GRANT: That's right.

Q: Could you describe his method of operation and how you saw him?

GRANT: You see, at the beginning of the Nixon Administration, Nixon selected Kissinger to be his National Security Advisor and assistant. He had—oh, hell, I can't think of his name—who had been his campaign advisor on foreign affairs, who arrived on the scene and was sort of attached to the NSC staff. The result of this, I'm sure that's why it happened, is that very ostentatiously, nobody was made deputy, because it would have been very hard not to make—I can't think of his name.

Q: You can add that later.

GRANT: Right. It would be very hard to appoint a deputy who was not him. So what you had was Henry at the top and a whole series of the senior most guys, all of whom had so-called equal ranking. But Al Haig was pulled in to sit at that desk outside Henry's office and to run the flow after Larry left. This obviously put him on the inside track. I can recall

Henry said, “We're going to have to have staff meetings. We've got to keep informed.” Well, he tried to organize one, and after about half an hour of waiting for him—when we had thousands of things to do—Al was called away. Then he came back, with some embarrassment, actually giggling with embarrassment, because it was sort of a delicate situation, and said that Henry had asked him to go ahead and run the meeting. As I said, there was much giggling on his part and much obvious annoyance on the part of some of the other people sitting there.

The second staff meeting, Henry called but then canceled. That was the last of the scheduled staff meetings. From that time on, Al just acted as amanuensis to Henry. The stuff did pass through Henry's hands. Henry would turn to him and say, “Get this, this, and this. I need such and such. Has somebody gotten the papers ready for such and such?” I can remember Henry shaving and getting dressed in his black tie to go out, in the men's room, Al by his side, taking notes. Henry said, “I'll be back about 11:00.” This was probably about 7:30 in the evening. “I'll be back about 11:00. If you'd have these ready for me, I'd appreciate it.”

So basically, the way Al operated was to hang in there, treat him with respect, and never sleep. I remember Al, when we were talking one time, his wife called up on the phone and they had to get a car. [Chuckles] His end of the conversation was, “Yes, well, you think we really need it?” Obviously, the other end of the line said, “Yes, we've just got to.” Then he said, “Well, if you like it, buy it.” [Laughter] He was just wedded to that office.

Q: Did he know anything about foreign affairs?

GRANT: Al was a good, bright study. I mean, he was no clown. For one thing, he was a political colonel who had spent his life in that part of the system, just getting over to Vietnam long enough to get his ticket punched, as they say in the Army. His mind was subtle and he was familiar with foreign issues. There were times when I disagreed and

got rather annoyed sometimes when I thought he was being too cavalier, but I never remember a time when I thought, “This is a dumb son of a bitch.” No, he was bright.

Q: But did he understand? So often the military can be very bright, people coming out of that environment, but there is a tendency to want to get things done. Again, this is where your tunnel vision comes back at you in spades. The Oliver North case is a prime example.

GRANT: There's a lot of difference between a Marine lieutenant colonel and an Army colonel, particularly a political one. Yes, the “Can-do, gung-ho, charge!” Marine thing, I agree, and that's, I think, terribly dangerous. People who have been aides-de-camp to generals before and have played the Byzantine struggles are pretty well schooled in subtlety, and getting things done is not necessarily nearly as important as seeing that your private agenda is taken care of. No, I would not accuse Al of lack of subtlety. I think his problem later on was, regrettably—of course with a lot of very bitter Army generals passed over—he moved up so fast, and to be in his position, particularly in the NATO command job, can be, as it was with Henry, dangerous for one's balance. I think that Al lost his, and I think that to a degree Henry became much too confident later on.

Q: You were seeing both these people at a time when you were really working pretty much as a team.

GRANT: Right, and we were all new to the job.

Q: And also with a President who, by all accounts, knew foreign policy, was interested in it, and had a remarkable mind for it.

Q: As I say, I would fault Henry just on that point, that when all is said and done, and people learn to sort out the Jekyll-Hyde problem with Nixon, they're going to find that what Henry succeeded with was what the President had set him on to, like China.

I really think that Henry went along with a number of people who got over-confident on the Vietnam issue. I had a very definite feeling that the President was willing, in those first months—well, actually, most of the first year—to say, “We will cut our losses with honor.” In other words, we will try to give the GVN—the government of Vietnam, the South Vietnamese—the material support, so that they can do it if they can hack it, but we are not in forever to fight the war for them.” I think that he was in a frame of mind that would welcome this.

About that time, people began to realize that the Viet Cong—the North Vietnamese—had lost so much in the Tet Offensive of 1968. At first, everybody thought the Tet Offensive showed how much strength they had. Later on, it became pretty clear how many of their assets they wasted. There was a tremendous surge of over-confidence, and our people thought, “Well, we've got them on the ropes now.” And as Governor Harriman used to say, “Don't escalate your goals in mid-stream.” I think we did just that. I think Henry, when all is said and done, will be found to have pushed the President the wrong way on that one.

Q: You left the NSC after about a year and a half. Where did you go?

GRANT: To the War College.

Q: You left NSC when? That would have been July?

GRANT: July or August, enough time to get into the War College.

Q: Of 1971?

GRANT: 1971. Yes, '69 and '70, the first half of '70. That's right.

Q: So you came out of the War College. Where did you go then?

GRANT: To policy planning in State.

Q: What was policy planning doing? At one time, policy planning, particularly under George Kennan, and before that, Robert Bowie, it was a rather powerful organization, and it sort of faded from the knowledge of people like myself, who worked 30 years in the Department of State. Was there much policy planning in State at the time? We're talking about '71, '72.

GRANT: That's right. No, there isn't much. The period you talked about was the heyday. A Secretary of State who wants something to be done, if he wanted to, could use this as his vehicle. He's got the personnel slots there. This was under a Secretary who was totally overshadowed by Kissinger.

Q: William Rogers.

GRANT: Right. It was a pleasant assignment. As a matter of fact, it was sort of like what as a young man I thought it would be, to be in the Foreign Service and in Policy Planning. I can remember actually going in and just having conversations with Mr. Rogers—who was a delightful person—about China, and sending him messages about ideas that he might want to try. But the thing was, he wasn't the one who was getting things on China done.

I can remember I went by to see Marshall Green and Bill Sullivan in the Far Eastern Bureau, as it was then called—East Asian Affairs—and I said, “Okay, I'm the Far Eastern type in Policy Planning. What would you like?” And Bill Sullivan's reaction was, “Do some of those really good think pieces that you guys turn out.” And I said, “So we won't get in your hair?” And he laughed.

In other words, the bureaus don't particularly want Policy Planning to be doing policy planning, and it functions only if you get a central administration that says, “Somebody has got to put this together and force different bureaus into contact,” which is what Policy Planning really should be doing, it shouldn't be substituting for the bureaus, I think. It should be the mechanism that forces the airing, the exposure of interactions

between policies, so that you get some sort of long-term perspective and multidimensional perspective of where you're heading.

It should also, in my book, be the one that organizes what the Department has been woefully deficient in, and that is better contact with other elements of the government. I think there's a lot Policy Planning could do, but it did not have a niche then, and so far as I know—I'm way off touch now—it has not really found one. It tends to write speeches and do things like that. Usually they cause trouble with the speeches because they don't bother to clear them with the right people. That's why I left and went to Cyprus, thinking it might be fun to see a different part of the world.

Q: You went to Cyprus as deputy chief of mission in 1972.

GRANT: The end of '72, yes.

Q: How long were you there?

GRANT: Just under two years.

Q: Who was ambassador when you were there?

GRANT: Most of the time I was charg#. When I went, the people in the Department already knew that David Popper would be going. He did. He went home on leave, got his assignment, came back very briefly, and then went back to become the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations Affairs. Then I was charg# for a long time. There was one abortive appointment. The person refused it. No, I guess first Bob McCloskey was given the job, and then he was pulled back by Henry to resume his press contacts. So there Anne McCloskey was, and I had to escort two people, my wife and Anne to all the official functions. I was charg#. Then his appointment was terminated and I remained charg# until Rodger Davies' ill-fated appointment.

Q: What were our principal issues with Cyprus at that time?

GRANT: Aside from some small housekeeping things, we had some operations there, including our FBIS.

Q: We had a small Loran station.

GRANT: A little bit of stuff that we were running there as a matter of convenience. But the primary issue about Cyprus was—still is—the impact that it has on the connections between Turkey and Greece and, consequently, on the southern and eastern flank of NATO and our position in the region. There are competing claims over Cyprus. The Greek majority, of course, would love to be part of Greece, they say, though a lot of them wouldn't.

Q: I wonder how much they really want to.

GRANT: There are enough of them so that they manage to raise hell, and it's a tremendously complicated relationship. I'd better not try to get into it in great depth. But basically, the fear is always that what did happen will happen. We lived through it, but it could have meant war between Turkey and Greece and a very difficult problem for NATO.

The problem can best be described by saying what happened. There was a military junta, and not a very bright one, in Athens. Archbishop Makarios despised them, but because of this funny relationship, you could not be against #nosis, union with Greece. The Greek Greeks, from Greece itself, officered the National Guard, which was made up of young Cypriot lads, and tried to fill them full of #nosis. Makarios, I suspect, would have been delighted for #nosis to occur under him. He had a very broad view of his historical role. There was an earlier parallel a half century before in Crete, where the leader brought Crete into Greece and became the leader of Greece. Makarios could have done that, but

things had gone otherwise, and we certainly didn't like to have his own National Guard officered by and being indoctrinated by Greek officers responsive to their junta.

What worried us was always that somebody would get ham-handed enough to try to impose more direct control on Cyprus from Greece, and that the Turks wouldn't tolerate this and would invade, which, of course, is exactly what happened. It happened because Archbishop Makarios, being a man of cunning and reason himself, assumed too much reason and too little philetimo pride, on the part of the junta in Athens. He taunted them with their smallness and, in effect, said, “I am going to be the one who commissions new National Guard officers.” The dictators—the junta—in Athens turned their officered National Guard loose to try to kill Makarios, and they missed him.

They put in command, as president, a person who I think was probably certifiably psychotic, who was known for his virulent hatred of the Turks and his willingness to kill them any time he could. Having made this error that was going to pose a real danger of bringing the Turks in, they compounded it by putting in charge the one person that was sure to bring the Turks in. The foreign minister was a guy who was very fond of Americans. He was always around, and he came by for advice. We didn't want to touch him, but finally, I went downstairs and remember talking to him. I said, “The only way you people have a chance is to persuade the Turks that you don't have any intention of touching their enclaves in Cyprus.” And he went down to the edge of the Turkish sector and agreed to see Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader. He actually sat and waited. But Denktash wouldn't see him.

Q: You were in Cyprus at the time?

GRANT: That's right.

Q: We're talking about July 1974.

GRANT: Yes. We almost charged too fast into that. We didn't set the time.

Q: Because I had just left Athens. I had been consul general in Athens from 1970 to 1974. So this is July 1974, where this happened. When the officers went off to kill Makarios, what were you doing at the Embassy?

GRANT: What was I doing, myself?

Q: Yes.

GRANT: This was early in the morning. We were leaving. My wife had already left, because I knew this was coming. I was confident. As a matter of fact, I remember drafting a telegram saying, “We think they're going to try to kill Makarios.” We said it in the summary of that telegram. The Ambassador, newly arrived, said, “We can't say that people are going to kill a foreign head of state just like that, in the summary.” So we took it out of the summary, but left it in the body of the message. But anyway, it was that clear how fast this was moving.I had gotten my wife, since we were already planning to leave, out on a flight a few days before. I was, of all things, putting our cat on the early morning flight. That cat took the last flight that has left Nicosia airport from that day to this. I decided to go on down to the office to see what was happening, got there, and we could begin to hear some rumbling. One of the officers, the administrative officer, lived near the president's palace. He called and said, “There are tanks moving towards the palace.” That's how it started.

The tanks came towards the front door. It wasn't a very wise maneuver, I thought, a very sophisticated one. Tanks came to the front door, and we learned later from a first-hand account of Makarios' assistant, that Makarios' military aide came through the French doors and said, “The tanks are approaching. Shall we go?” Makarios turned and said goodbye to this guy, walked out the French doors, down the lawn, into a car waiting in the back, and they took off, as we later learned, for the British military base. But even his whereabouts were not known for some time. Then the British told us privately. This, of course, brought the Turks in.

Q: To get an idea of how the embassy works, the ambassador was brand-new, I take it. That was Rodger Davies.

GRANT: That's right.

Q: What were we doing at our embassy? Here were the two allies.

GRANT: I'll tell you were what we were doing. During the spring before Rodger arrived, we were trying to persuade the Department to beat up on your boss.

Q: Henry Tasca.

GRANT: Tasca. With our embassy in Ankara saying, “Go, go, go,” endorsing everything we said. “You've got to tell the Greeks that if they open this one up, that there's no way we can control it if the Turks decide they're going to move, and they may very well.” Tasca never would do it. It was, finally, the station chief who went in and made a pitch, but Tasca just wasn't about ready to do it.

There was another problem at that time. Cyprus had just been moved from the Near Eastern Bureau to the European Bureau In State, and European Bureau had other things to think about. It seemed like a very little country a long way away. We were worried about this. I remember we were asked to do contingency planning if things should happen, and we were the first one in the Bureau to get ours in, because we thought this was important. But nobody paid, of course, the slightest bit of attention to a theoretical plan. Washington tended to be concerned about the status of the negotiations which had been going on for years to resolve the division of Cyprus between small Turkish enclaves and the big Greek enclave. This had been going on and on, and actually it looked like it might have some hope of success. Tom Boyatt was the Office Director. Remembering that as the issue, he kept asking us questions about that, whereas the real issue had become this threat of a

Greek move against Makarios. So as a government, we were woefully unprepared, with a new bureau trying to handle this.

Of course, Henry Kissinger turned up on the scene after the balloon went up. The Turks, of course, did come in. Henry had been running the Bowie seminar at Harvard when—I guess it was Ecevit, the Turkish prime or foreign minister, I forget now, I think prime minister—had been a student there. And Henry thought he could presume on the student-professor relationship and, of course, got absolutely nowhere. Several people came out and each got a total cold shoulder from the Turks.

Q: Were there any moves against our embassy by the Cypriot National Guard or anyone else?

GRANT: Not until the fatal move. Basically, what happened was, just to finish the larger story, then focus down, the thing that probably kept the situation from going into real chaos was that Ioannidis, the junta leader in Athens, did fall as a result of his miscalculation in Cyprus. And who was it that came in? The old fellow. An elder statesman came back, and he lined up his Cabinet, and he obviously said to them, “We're going to walk out of this room. The press is out there, and I'm going to say, 'We're not going to fight Turkey over Cyprus.' You people are all going to smile and nod.” And that's what happened. He just took it on himself and had the stature to carry it off, to unilaterally bug out of what a lot of Greeks were chomping for, and that was another go at the Turks, which would have been disastrous, I think. That is what froze the situation again. It was a belated act of statesmanship at the last minute, by one leader.

We had never assumed—as a matter of fact, our instructions to our Americans in Cyprus pointed out that we would not be the target of the first violence. Later on, somebody would start blaming us. That's what happened. After the first war, which was the inter-Greek war between the pro-Makarios and the pro-Ioannidis factions, that was resolved rather swiftly in favor of the Ioannidis faction, which put in this man Sampson. That led to the first

Turkish invasion. As a matter of fact, after that Turkish invasion, having nothing better to do, I went around to all the Cabinet ministers and just had conversations with them to find out what they were thinking—I mean, the ex-Makarios Cabinet members. Nobody was blaming the US

But then the Turks made that second move, and the US suddenly emerged as the scapegoat. During a demonstration against the Embassy, demanding we do something to get the Turks out, a sniper got up on a building being completed nearby and shot blind into the ambassador's office and down the hall and—by a horrible break—managed to kill both the Ambassador and one of the local employees.

The chance that this would happen, that the anger would turn on us, we had always seen as very high, because the Cypriot Greeks simply would not—we had stopped the Turks once before in 1964, I guess it was, or '65, and they thought we could do it again. I spent a lot of my time before this happened telling little stories about how we couldn't stop them, to try to get the Cypriot Greeks less confident that we were going to save their skins. One of the stories, I remember, concerned the Turks' decision simply to back out of their opium control agreement with us. They found it too expensive. The farmers were unhappy. I pointed out, “Here's something of tremendous importance to the United States, much more important than Cyprus to America—the drug problem. We couldn't stop the Turks from growing opium, and you should take that as a lesson as to what we could do if the Turks decided to move against you. It had absolutely no effect on them.

Consequently, when they turned, they turned much more virulently. The erstwhile Foreign Minister, Christophides, when he came in to sign the condolence book for the Ambassador, started telling me—down there in the lobby of the embassy—how Rodger had been murdered by the CIA because he was too soft on the Greeks, and that it was all our fault that the war started, we had put the junta up to it. It was just an incredible reversal in a week. A week before he had had nothing to say about a US role.

So there you are. You started by asking what was the importance of Cyprus, and that is the importance. The thing that shouldn't have happened did happen. The thing that kept it from being as bad as it could have been was the action by that old prime minister who came back and simply opted out of a war with Turkey.

Q: How well were you served at this point by the CIA? I say that because having been in Athens, which was well known as being really a CIA-dominated post at the time, had incredibly good relations with the rather obnoxious regime of [George] Papadopoulos, then Ioannidis came in thereafter. Were you kept abreast of what was developing? Or do you think the Agency was caught as flat-footed as everyone else by the developments there? Flat-footed is the wrong term. You knew what could happen.

GRANT: No, that's the point. We actually, as I say, in advance, sent a message saying this was going to happen. I think that the Agency people in Nicosia were excellent. We had no problem. Our relations were very good. I think there was a great deal of candor, and I think we saw things in very much the same light. The other thing to be said is that unlike China, you didn't need the Agency. Cyprus was so transparent, everybody loved to talk. Here's an angle. At the critical time—now, Rodger Davies had been a Near Eastern man, and he had known some of the people, including the number two man in the foreign ministry, Veniamin who was, of course, my regular contact. Veniamin was having a party on July 2, his big annual sweep-up. Rodger Davies was not going to present his credentials until the fifth. I knew that they were sensitive to protocol. I went to Veniamin and said, “Here's what's happening. Rodger's coming in. What I'd like to do is this: I'll hold the Fourth of July party as host, but I'll introduce Rodger to everybody at that time, if you don't mind, even though he will not have been formally introduced to the Archbishop yet.”

Veniamin, having been asked, was as gracious as could be and said, “Of course. And also bring him to my reception on the second. I'd like to see him again.”

And I did. As we left, Veniamin said to me, “We sent it.” The point is, I knew exactly what he meant, and he knew I knew it. “It” was a letter that had been kicking around among the Archbishop's closest advisors, the one that insulted Ioannidis and said, “I'm going to run my show.”

I said, “I hope you get away with it.”

And he said, “It'll work.” His thinking—that of the Archbishop—was that Ioannidis, restrained by the Turks, would not be able to trump the Archbishop's decision to take over more control of the National Guard. Again, assuming that Ioannidis would be rational, whereas Ioannidis had had his pride hurt. All of this we knew. I had seen texts of that letter. That's how transparent it was. In this case, we really did know it was going to happen.

Q: I might mention that Ioannidis was the chief of the Greek military police, to give you an idea of his background. But how about the Turkish side? Were you getting reports saying, “The Turks are going to go in. The Turks are loading ships, loading planes” or not?

GRANT: Yes, we were getting, I thought, quite adequate coverage of the physical evidence of movement, and we knew very well that the Turks had put plans into motion, but you never knew the intentions in this case. Were they doing this as a bluff to force the Greek hand or not? We had plenty of intelligence about what the Turks planned to do, but you always have enough on either side and enough uncertainty about a possible plant that you can never be 100% sure of any intelligence you get. In this particular case, there was one message that said, “The Turks are mobilizing and are using this Genghis Khan division. These guys are all over 6” tall, they all hate Greeks, they're all illiterate. They're savages.” This was being leaked to the Greeks to scare the Greeks. It was so obvious that my question was: Is it being used to try to scare us into making bigger efforts to get the Greeks to back up? It turned out, in fact, that they went ahead.

I remember a few days beforehand in that interim, while we were waiting, a sort of silence, we knew about the movements of troops. The military attach# said, “I'll bet four to one that they come in.” And I remember saying, “At four to one, I'll take the other side of it. But at five to two, I'll bet they'll come in.” In other words, we were speculating, and that was the range. We all thought it was more than likely. He, by the way, didn't make a bet. [Laughter] He said, “No, I don't think I'll put any money on it.” But that expectation was not because of good intelligence about Turkish intentions. We knew much more about how the Greeks felt. Even the Turks like [Rauf] Denktash, he didn't know what the Turks on the mainland were going to do. Denktash was the leading Turk on the island. The Turkish Ambassador, I'm pretty confident, didn't know.

But given our assumptions about the Turkish reaction to this whole behavior—Ioannidis had pulled back enough to take Sampson, the madman, out, and put in the most reasonable Greek he could find: Clerides, the one who had negotiated with the Turks before. At the last moment, they put him in as President. But that was too late to stop the machinery. We assumed that since the machinery was still rolling and the Turks were not asking for any information or beginning negotiations—the Turks tend to move slowly and monolithically, and in this I could see something of the Chinese Communists—so our guess was that they were for serious, that they wanted a chance to get at these guys. They were mad enough, and since they weren't putting out any feelers to see what Clerides might offer them, they were probably going to roll it.

So we were pretty much on that wavelength. We did get all the Americans out, all the dependents and all the people we could find, and this was pretty complete. In time. I'm rather proud of that. In other words, we were acting on the basis of an assumption which turned out right, in this case.

Q: When did you leave?

GRANT: Rodger had his own DCM coming, as is traditional, and I had already asked for and gotten another assignment. I wanted to get into environment and population issues, which I did, and I had a job there. Rodger said, “It looks like they've stopped,” after the first Turkish wave. And they did, they paused for about eight or ten days, as I recall. My timing is weak now. So he said, “There's not much to do. We're just sitting here and watching the thing freeze. Why don't you go ahead out?” And I went out by British military air transport, and was flown back the same way two or three days later, when Rodger was shot. I was not on the island when he was shot. I was in Scotland taking a vacation.

Q: Then how long were you back?

GRANT: Until the new ambassador was appointed and arrived on the scene.

Q: Who was that?

GRANT: Bill Crawford.

Q: Let's move to the environment side now, shall we?

GRANT: Sure.

Q: What did this environmental job consist of? Why did you get it?

GRANT: Well, it seems ungrateful to the Department and may be taken amiss by young people who are interested in a career in the Foreign Service. I got more and more convinced that most of what I had been doing or could do was rather peripheral to the really important things that were happening in the world. I guess I was swept up, and had been for some years, in the population issue. I take pride in having been the first to report about population policy and issues in both Communist China and Taiwan.

I became more and more convinced that the related explosions of technology, including nuclear weapons, population, pressure on resources, pressure on the environment—the

rate of change, in effect, of the world—there had been nothing like this before, and this was the central issue of our time, and that in bilateral diplomacy, you simply don't get into the big issues.

So I was looking for a way to get at it, and I was lucky. Basically, there were two jobs in the Department that related to this. One was the office directorship of the Office of Environmental Affairs, and the other was the Deputy Assistant Secretaryship for Environment and Population. I went first to the office director job, then got the Deputy Assistant job when Chris Herter, Jr., left at the change of administration or before it.

I'm still convinced it was right. I think that I learned more in that period than I had anywhere, except perhaps the NSC staff, about the way the world really wags, because you have to put together these international issues. What's an international environmental office doing? Well, basically, it's beginning to take on the kinds of issues you can't address alone. We were the ones who launched the acid rain thing, and the ozone business. We got the President to ask for the Global 2000 Study. These broad issues of trying to share what Adlai Stevenson so beautifully called “a fragile spaceship” seemed to me just—this is where it is. You can't handle it in isolation. In State, we have a relationship with CIA, USIS, and the Pentagon. The economic boys have some connection with Commerce. But the degree to which we stay within ourselves—particularly on the bilateral side—I find just simply irrelevant.

So I was anxious to get there. I was told by my friends, “You're mad. OES (Office of Oceans, Environment, and Science) is a dead end for any Foreign Service officer.” I didn't really mind, because that's where I wanted to be. It was a fascinating period, and we did launch, as I indicated, the beginnings of some of the big multilateral efforts that we're working on now. It's a whole new world.

Q: Because we want to concentrate just on the time you were doing this, was there much interest within the State Department for this type of work? Or was it not considered substantive in the State Department vocabulary?

GRANT: I'll tell you a story that is in the book that I did on foresight and decision making. Right after the change of administrations, when the Reagan Administration came in, there was a National Intelligence Estimate being done on relations with the Third World. It was being chaired by the head of Policy Planning. (So there's one example where Policy Planning was at least doing a thinking job). That was Tony Lake, as I recall. I learned about it—It is useful to have a Foreign Service Officer in this environmental job, one from the old political and management training, because I could talk to the people—I knew them. I said to him, “You can't talk about US relations with the Third World without dealing with the population issue and resource and environment issues, which are just galloping.” And he was embarrassed by this and waffled around. So I gave him some language. He didn't want to worry about it; he wanted just to worry about the old business about who we should be making gestures to—the politically oriented stuff, who was more important than whom.

Finally, the resolution was that this paper started out with a paragraph saying, “There are all these terrible issues”—which I had described—”but we are not dealing with them in this NIE because we are focusing on the near and intermediate term.” Of course, the question is: when the hell does the long-term start? That was the attitude. There were several occasions where I actually found some ground that I knew was very highly defensible and insisted on injecting myself. One of them was whether the Department of State would comment on an environmental impact statement on the question of admitting the Concorde to US air space. We had to take this to—

Q: A supersonic passenger plane.

GRANT: That's correct. We had to take this one—EUR and I—to the Deputy Secretary. We got a decision in our favor. This kind of thing did tend to get them to realize that here was an outfit—you had to at least let them in, or they'll holler and scratch you.

There was another one in which I was in the Deputy Secretary's meeting, standing in for the Assistant Secretary at that time, and when it came my turn—they had been talking about the Panama Canal—I said, “If we don't do an environmental impact statement on the Panama Canal Treaty, we may, for the first time in American history, have a judicial restraint order issued against a foreign policy action.” And I explained why.

The Deputy Secretary turned to the Legal Advisor and said, “Is this true?”

The Legal Advisor said, “Yes, that's a possibility.” And then I got my EIS.

As I say, one simply used this technique to force yourself in. I got, in my time there, no sense that anybody really related this to what they were concerned about; they just grudgingly let me do my thing to keep me quiet.

Q: You were sort of a gadfly, but this was the beginning of saying, “You can't let this one go.”

GRANT: That's what I figured. That's why I was doing it. And slowly. The world has changed. Those of us who are in this area are so aware of it. We have got to be in a multilateral cooperative frame of reference. The Cold War is not only dead, it is hopelessly irrelevant to the kinds of issues that we have to be dealing with, and they are rough ones. I mean, who pays the price in industrial production for saving the atmosphere from a certain amount of pollution? These are gut issues and they are—particularly as we fail to get the population problem under control—central to human life on Earth. So as I say, believe me, I was delighted to get this job that was considered dead. When that came to an end, I left.

Q: If you have anything you've written on this, you might give it to me when you get the transcript and we'll include it. How would that be?

GRANT: I don't think you realize what you're asking. I've been writing for ten years, and I've got books, chapters.

Q: You can make some references to where they might be.

GRANT: Sure. I'd be delighted.

Q: Because we use this as a resource. If you can give me what amounts to a bibliography.

GRANT: I could. As a matter of fact, I should have taken my bibliography. I might attach it. Some of the books should be here in the library.

Q: They can find them elsewhere, too, because they will distribute this interview.

GRANT: I would be delighted. I appreciate the chance.

Q: I want to thank you very, very much for this.

GRANT: Thanks. It was a pleasure.

[End of interview]

PUBLICATIONS

A. Books/Booklets:

The Cornucopian Fallacies. (Washington: The Environmental Fund, 1982.)

Thinking Ahead: Foresight in the Political Process. (ditto)

Whatever Happened to the Population Bomb? With Carl Haub. (Fund —now Population Environment Balance — 1982.)

Foresight and National Decisions: the Horseman and the Bureaucrat. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988.)

B. Articles/Book Chapters:

“The Mullet Fishermen” (The State magazine, Raleigh, N.C., May & July 1979.)

“Speculator in the Cornfield” (Journal of Soil and Water Conservation, March-April 1979.)

“Immigration and the American Conscience”, with Dr. John Tanton (in Progress As If Survival Mattered. San Francisco: Friends of the Earth, 1981.)

“The Cornucopian Fallacies: the Myth of Perpetual Growth” (The Futurist, August 1983.)

“The Unexpected Results of our Actions” (in Science, Technology and Foreign Affairs, Vol.I. Washington: US Department of State, FSI, 1984.)

“Perceptions of Models, Golden Kingdoms and Policy Futures” (in Global Modeling and Discontinuous Change, Gerald R. Stairs, Ed. Durham, NC: Duke University Center for International Studies, 1984.)

“Foresight. What it is. What is Needed.” (Testimony before Joint Hearing, Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and the District of Columbia and the Committee on Environment and Public Works, US Senate. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1986.)

“Interacting Analytic Support and the Policy Process” (in Foresight Planning: Realities and Resiliency at the Policy Interface, Gerald R. Stairs, Ed. Durham, NC: Duke University Center for International Studies, 1986.)

“A Population Focus for US Aid” (Monograph in NPG FORUM series. Teaneck, NJ: Negative Population Growth, June 1987.)

“Europe in the Energy Transition: the Case for a smaller Population” (NPG FORUM series; as above. 1988.)

“How Many Americans?” (in Immigration in the 1980s: Reappraisal and Reform, David Simcox, Ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.)

“Too Many Old People or too Many Americans? Thoughts on the Pension Panic.” (NPG FORUM series; as above. 1988.)

“Foresight.” (The Futurist, January-February 1989.) — excerpts printed under the title “Foresight: A Crystal Ball for Government” — their title, not mine — in The Woodlands Forum (Center for Growth Studies, Houston Area Research Center, 4802 Research Forest Drive, The Woodlands TX 77381.) Winter 1988-1989.

"'NIMBYs' and The Fence” (NPG FORUM series; as above. 1989.)

“Reconciling Texas and Berkeley:” the Concept of Optimum Population. (NPG FORUM series; as above. 1989.)

End of interview